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Cipriani: The Limits of the Autonomy Principle: Refusal of Life-Sustaining

NOTE
THE LIMITS OF THE AUTONOMY PRINCIPLE:
REFUSAL OF LIFE-SUSTAINING MEDICAL
TREATMENT FOR INCOMPETENT PERSONS
I. INSTITUTIONALIZING AUTONOMY

A moral position is inherent in every act of selection.' This is
illustrated by the patent untruth of the aphorism that morality cannot
be legislated.2 "Cannot" here really means "should not" and "should

not" itself is a moral construct. Legal values reflecting detachment
from moral values in order to encourage tolerance of diverse moral
values3 are usurping the role formerly played by moral values themselves.4 Noninterference with the choices of others has become a favored moral stance5 which institutionalizes the American deification
of the illusion of choice.
Noninterference as a political philosophy has its counterpart in
the moral philosophy of cultural relativism 6 which posits that as indi-

1. See, e.g., JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, EXISTENTIA.ISM AND HuMANISM 17 (P. Mairet trans.,

Methuen & Co. 1948) (1946) ("[O]f all the actions a man may take in order to create himself as he wills to be, there is not one which is not creative, at the same time, of an image
of man such as he believes he ought to be."); LAURENCE H. TRIF, AMERCAN CoNsTmTTnONAL LAw 1350 (2d ed. 1988) ("[A]lU normative judgments are rooted in moral premises.").
2.

Robert N. Bellah, The Meaning of Reputation in American Society, 74 CAL. L. REv.

743, 751 (1986) ("[Ajlmost all legislation has moral consequences."); Eugene V. Rostow, The
Enforcement of Morals, 1960 CAMBRiDGE LJ. 174, 197 ("Men often say that one cannot
legislate morality. I should say that we legislate hardly anything else.").
3. See LEE BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMST
SPEECH IN AMERICA 107 (1986) (asserting that one purpose of the First Amendment relates
to the value of inculcation of tolerance by forcing people to endure repugnant speech).
4. Cf George P. Fletcher, Law and Morality: A Kantian Perspective, 87 COLUM. L.

REV. 533, 534 (1987) ("The law might even inform perceptions of 'absolute' moral truth:
insofar as understandings of the 'moral' are historically contingent, the law is one factor that
influences people in their assertions of critical morality.").
5.

See Kenneth L. Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 DUKE LJ. 447, 480 ("The limi-

tations of a jurisprudence of rights, as we now define rights, are the limitations of a morality
centered on noninterference.").
6. CHARLES DE SECONDAT MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS, Book 1, ch. 3, fiI 1214 (Thomas Nugent trans., 1750) (insisting that positive law is good or bad only in relation
to the culture of which it is both product and part).
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viduals, and as a culture, we must not judge others by our values but
by their own. Noninterference stems from the liberal tradition7 which

exalts, "separation, autonomy, individuation and natural rights"' and
equates "maturity . . with personal autonomy." 9
Liberal notions of autonomy originally focused on the
individual's relationship to the state and the need to keep the government from interfering with the beliefs and actions of individuals."

Autonomy values are no longer only part of the way we conceive our
relationship to the government: they are a part of the way we con-

ceive of our relationships with each other." We think in terms of
whether someone has a "right" to interfere in our decision-making. If
we conclude that a decision is "none of his business" then the other
may be excluded from participation in the decision. 2

7.
The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in
our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede
their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether
bodily, or mental and spiritual. Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other
to live as seems good to themselves, than by compelling each to live as seems
good to the rest.
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LmERTY 12-13 (Alburey Castell, ed., Harlan Davidson, Inc. 1947)
(1859).
8. CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIwFERENT VOICE 23 (1982); see also Kelley v. Johnson,

425 U.S. 238, 251 (1976) (Marshall, J., issenting) ("[The] values of privacy, self-identity,
autonomy, and personal integrity [are those] I have always assumed the Constitution was
designed to protect.").
9. GILLIGAN, supra note 8,at 17.
10. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("IT]he right to be let alone-[is] the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men ....");see also William W. Bratton, Jr., The "Nexus of Contracts"
Corporation:A Critical Appraisal, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 407, 463 (1989) (noting "the liberal
goal of noninterference by the sovereign").
!1.See, e.g., Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) ("No right is
held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every
individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others.
...
); Robert A. Burt, Constitutional Law and the Teaching of the Parables, 93 YALE L.J. 455, 489 (1984) (finding that the Supreme Court, in cases involving "the
claim for individual autonomy from relations with others in its recent cases involving retardation and racial segregation treats the simple assertion of the wish to avoid association as
intrinsically justified without any need to account for, or listen to, competing claims").
12. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Boundaries of the Self, 105 HARV. L.
REv. 959, 963-64 (1992).
Suppose I am at a dinner party, and the host urges me to stop drinking because I
will be driving home soon. I can respond by saying "Don't pester me so much; I
am solely responsible for my drunk driving. It is really none of your business." I
have taken subject-responsibility for my drunk driving. I identify it as an aspect of
myself ....
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A. Autonomy and the Right to Refuse Medical Treatment
This veneration of autonomy as our societal prime directive
makes grappling with the existence and scope 3 of an individual's
"right" to refuse medical treatment the source of dissension. A competent patient has a right to refuse medical treatment. t4 This right
has been based on an individual's common law right to refuse consent for treatment and has also been described as a constitutionally
protected liberty interest covered by the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause.'5 The right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment

Id.; see also Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and the Scarlet Letters: The Tension Between
Privacy and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 71 (1991) ('The
phrase, 'it's none of your business,' is no less crucial to the vocabulary of a free citizen
than the phrase, 'it's a free country."').
13. What is included under the right to refuse medical treatment is unclear. Interpretations have ranged from the stingy to the expansive. Compare Crzan v. Director, Missouri
Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990) (assuming for purposes of its decision that "the
United States Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to
refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition"); Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988)
(drawing distinction between removal of a respirator and removal of a feeding tube) with
Bouvia v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 306 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)
(finding "nothing in the law to suggest [that] the right to refuse medical treatment may be
exercised only if the patient's motives meet someone else's approval. It certainly is not illegal or immoral to prefer a natural, albeit sooner, death than a drugged life attached to a
mechanical device" despite competency and life expectancy of fifteen to twenty years if treatment was accepted).
14. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 277 ("[The common-law doctrine of informed consent is
viewed as generally encompassing the right of a competent individual to refuse medical treatment."). Several state courts have upheld a competent individual's right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d
417, 427 (Mass. 1977); In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404, 410 (NJ. 1987); In re Peter, 529 A.2d
419, 423 (N.J. 1987); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1222 (NJ. 1985); In re Quinlan, 355
A.2d 647, 663 (NJ. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); In re O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d
607, 611 (N.Y. 1988).
15. In Cruzan, the Supreme Court considered whether this right extends to an incompetent individual and indicated that such a right, whether grounded in the Constitution or the
common law, is dependent on decision-making capacity. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 261, 27980. The right is an individual right and consequently applies only to the individual and may
not be exercised by anyone besides the individual in the absence of state authorization of a
particular person or class of people, i.e., family member, physician, or guardian. Id. at 280.
The right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment is not absolute. Id. at 278-79. The
individual's liberty interest or common law right to refuse medical treatment is balanced
against the state's interests. Id. at 279. Cruzan involved a formerly competent young woman
reduced to a persistent vegetative state as the result of a car accident. Nancy Cruzan's parents petitioned the court to authorize the removal of the feeding tube without which unanimous medical opinion was that she could not live. l. at 266-69. The trial court granted the
parents' petition, finding a "fundamental right under the state and federal constitutions to
refuse or direct the withdrawal of 'death prolonging procedures' . . .." Al. at 268. The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed the trial court's decision, emphasizing the state's strong
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is not, despite popular shorthand, the right to die, 6 a phrase which
is used to cover euthanasia 7 and assisted suicide as well as refusal
of life-sustaining medical treatment.'" Possession of the right is dependent upon that right being exercised at some time when the individual had sufficient capacity to make a decision. 9
Societal hesitancy to fully accept this right may spring from an
unwillingness to protect suicide, 2° generalized discomfort with
death,2' and uncertainty of how those who are not viewed as autonomous are to be valued and treated in a society where autonomy is the
defining and primary value.' Decisions in this society are viewed

interest in preserving life. Cruzan v. Harmone, 760 S.W.2d 408, 419-20 (Mo. 1988). The
court concluded that a guardian may not decide to terminate treatment without proof of the
patient's wishes that would satisfy a clear and convincing evidence standard. Id. at 425. In
Nancy Cruzan's case, the Missouri Supreme Court found insufficient evidence of Nancy's
wishes to satisfy a clear and convincing evidence standard. Id. at 426.
16. See, e.g., id at 277 ("This is the first case in which we have been squarely presented with the issue whether the United States Constitution grants what is in common parlance referred to as a 'right to die."'); In re Storar, 420 N.E. 64, 79 (N.Y. 1981) (Fuchsberg,
J.,dissenting) ("For the ultimate and forbidding issues are no less than the right to live or, if
you will, the right to die."). Cf Lawrence K. Altman, Quinlan Case Is Revisited and Yields
New Finding, N.Y. Times, May 26, 1994, at A16 (quoting a New England Journal of Medicine editorial praising the parents of Karen Ann Quinlan "for turning their personal calamity
into a public benefit by launching the right-to-die movement").
17.
As evidence of the deep, fundamental disagreements that so mark this area, consider the status of the debate over active and passive euthanasia. If there is a dominant position with respect to these terms, it is that passive euthanasia may be
ethically and legally permissible under certain circumstances, while active euthanasia
is not ethically permissible and constitutes homicide, at least under some circumstances.
Thomas W. Mayo, Constitutionalizing the "Right to Die", 49 MD. L. REV. 103, 139 (1990).
18. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 270 ("The logical corollary of the doctrine of informed consent
is that the patient generally possesses the right not to consent, that is, to refuse treatment.").
19. See id. at 287 n.12
The differences between the choice made by a competent person to refuse medical
treatment, and the choice made for an incompetent person by someone else to
refuse medical treatment, are so obviously different that the State is warranted in
establishing rigorous procedures for the latter class of cases which do not apply to
the former class.
ld.
20. See Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988) (characterizing suicide as "deliberately ending a life by artificial means," distinguishable from self-determination "allowing
nature to take its course").
21. Michael R. Flick, Comment, The Due Process of Dying, 79 CAL L. REV. 1121,
1123 n.9 (1991) ("Because the choice of whether to die still eludes human grasp, people can
exert power only by positing how to die.").
22. See, e.g., Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 5 (1988)
(West describes "legal liberalism" as asserting that "[b]ecause I am separate, I am 'autono-
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exclusively in terms of competence and autonomy.' Personhood is
conceived of as bound to the ability to make choices to an extent
which denies the personhood of people who are considered as not
having the ability to choose.'
1. Autonomy and Suicide
If individual liberty is coextensive with autonomy, the right to
commit suicide is the logical extension of a right to refuse medical
treatment.' Recognition of a right to commit suicide, however, re-

quires acknowledgement that our notions of our relationship to God
and to each other have changed radically.' To acknowledge a right
to commit suicide is to say that ultimately each man is an island27
and that life and death are no longer the province of GodP or

mous . . . . And, of course, this is true not just of me, but of everyone: it is the universal
human condition. We are each separate and we are all separate, so we are each free and we
are all free. We are, that is, equally free.").
If, as West asserts later in her article, this vision of humans as isolated and autonomous is false for everyone, see id. at 7, it is still a less accurate reflection of people who
are viewed as incompetent. Since a "universal human condition" must apply to everyone, either incompetent people are not human because of their lack of autonomy or the supposition
that complete independence is a precondition of humanity is incorrect.
23. See Samuel H. Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal
Punishment, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 655, 662 (1989) ("Autonomy measures the individual's
capacity to make an independent moral choice.").
24.
If the ultimate goal is the free development of personality, and personality development implies the capacity and freedom to make conscious choices, then given a
choice between a person fully capable of choices and a partial person not so
equipped, one favors the fully developed person. Personhood gives rights that can
be limited only by the rights of other persons. The maximization of personality
requires that those capable of choices not be inhibited by the supposed needs of
those living forms who are not as yet truly capable of choice.
David M. Smolin, The Jurisprudenceof Privacy in a Splintered Supreme Court, 75 MARQ. L.
REV. 975, 989 (1992).
25. See Bouvia v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 305 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1986) (noting "the fact that a desire to terminate one's life is probably the ultimate
exercise of one's right to privacy"); see also Martha A. Mathews, Comment, Suicidal Competence and the Patient's Right to Refise Lifesaving Treatment, 75 CAL. L. REv. 707, 710
(characterizing "some refusals of treatment . . . as 'suicidal' because they fall within the
commonly understood concept of suicide").
26. See generally JOHN McMANNERS, DEATH AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT (1981).
27. See Donald L. Beschle, Autonomous Decisionmaking and Social Choice: Examining
the "Right to Die", 77 Ky. L.J. 319, 321 (1988) ("Liberty, when understood as a positive
entitlement, comes perilously close to designating the loneliness of Robinson Crusoe as the
ideal life.").
28. HANs KUNG, CREDO: THE APOsTLES' CREED EXPLAINED FOR TODAY 185 (1994)
("[Tihe end of life is also, more than hitherto, made a human responsibility (not a whim!) by
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nature29 but of human beings.' Much of the commentary discussing
the difference between the right to refuse treatment and the right to
commit suicide focuses on the notion that the refusal of medical

treatment passively allows the natural progression towards death."
This reasoning adheres to the idea that death is an area of natural

control outside the realm of human order 2 which therefore must be
resisted as long as possible33 in order to extend the reach of humanly assigned meaning.'
2. Discomfort with Death
The consideration and acceptance of death implicit in acknowledgement of the right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment is the

source of the ambivalence which characterizes discussion of the scope
of the right.35 The nature of death eludes consensus.'

Death may

the same God who does not want us to foist on him a responsibility which we ourselves can
and should bear.").
29. See SHERw B. NULtAND, How WE DIE: REFLECTONS ON LIFE'S FINAL CHAPTER
at xv (1994) ("We can now deny the power not only of death but of nature itself.").
30. See Fettefly v. Paskett, 15 F.3d 1472, 1483 (9th Cir. 1994) ("Where does the judge
get the authority to sentence a person to die if not from a statute?'); The Supreme Court,
1985 Term-Leading Cases, 100 HARV. L. REV. 100, 106 (1986) ("Mhe deep meaning of
capital punishment . . . [is] that the state absolutely controls life and death within its borders.").
31. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1224 (NJ. 1985) ("Refusing medical intervention merely allows the disease to take its natural course; if death were eventually to occur, it would be the result, primarily, of the underlying disease, and not the result of a selfinflicted injury.").
32.
Death is unique. It is unlike aught else in its certainty and its incidents. A corpse
is in some respects the strangest thing on earth. A man who but yesterday
breathed and thought and walked among us has passed away. Something has gone.
The body is left still and cold, and is all that is visible to mortal eye of the man
we knew. Around it cling love and memory. Beyond it may reach hope.
Rollins v. Phillips, 554 So.2d 1006, 1009 (Ala. 1989) (quoting Louisville & Nashville R.R. v.
Wilson, 51 S.E. 24, 25 (Ga. 1905)).
33. See NULAND, supra note 29, at 10 (describing "the prevailing temperament of our
times, when death is regarded as the final and perhaps the ultimate challenge of any person's
life-a pitched battle that must be won").
34. Cf. James B. Hannah, The Signs of Death: Historical Review, 28 N.C. MED. J. 457,
457 (1967) ("Every individual devises his own emotional constructs with which he protects
himself from involvement with thoughts of death.").
35. Compare Roper Opinion Poll, Nov. 15, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library.
RPOLL file (seventy-eight percent of people polled agree that a patient in great pain has the
right to stop medical treatment) with Roper Opinion Poll, Dec. 6, 1993, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, RPOLL file (only forty-one percent of people polled approved of suicide as a
response to great pain); see also Leslie Bender, A Feminist Analysis of Physician-Assisted
Dying and Voluntary Active Euthanasia, 59 TENN. L. REV. 519, 525 (1992) (A Washington
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be conceived of as a part of life,37 an absolute end to all life,3" the

beginning of a new earthly life39 or relocation to another plane of
existence.' There is no definitive opinion on how death should be
approached and weighed.4" There may be an underlying societal

sense that death has its own inherent value or meaning and that it is,
in some important and universal way, not something that human

initiative which "would have been the first in the country to explicitly permit physician aidin-dying . . . failed by a small margin at the polls (fifty-four percent to forty-six percent),
despite earlier polls that indicated a sure victory.").
36. See, e.g., HENRY WARD BEECHER, EYES AND EARS 132 (1862) ("There is no unmixed good in this world except dying."); THE HEART OF NATHANiEL HAWTHORNE'S JOURNALS 10 (Newton Arvin ed., Barnes & Noble 1967) (1929) (quoting Hawthorne's journal
entry of Oct. 25, 1835) ("We sometimes congratulate ourselves at the moment of waking
from a troubled dream: it may be so the moment after death."); John Damton, In Sweden,
Proof of the Power of Words, N.Y. TamEs, Dec. 8, 1993, at C17 (citing Toni Morrison's
1993 Nobel Prize in Literature lecture) ("We die, that may be the meaning of life. But we
do language. That may be the measure of our lives.").
37. See, e.g., DANIEL CALLAHAN, THE TROUBLmED DREAm OF LiFE 167 (1993) ("Death
is a part of the life cycle and . . . indeed, death is a positive resource for the vigor and
continuation of the species."); NULaND, supra note 29, at 267 ("We die, in turn, so that
others may live. The tragedy of a single individual becomes, in the balance of natural things,
the triumph of ongoing life.").
38. See J. Stuart Showalter, Determining Death: The Legal and Theological Aspects of
Brain Related Criteria, 27 CATH. LAW. 112 (1982) (Showalter notes that historically "death
was a simple occurrence-one was either dead or alive. Death was simply '[t]he cessation of
life; the ceasing to exist."') (quoting BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 488 (4th ed. 1951)); see
also Jill Klessig, The Effect of Values and Culture on Life-Support Decisions, 157 W. J.
MED. 316, 319 (1992) ("Jews do not have the same belief in an afterlife or reincarnation
that other faiths do. There is the feeling thaf 'when it's over, it's over,' and there is no
point in prolonging futile care").
39. See Kenneth L. Woodward, Heaven, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 27, 1989, at 54 ("If liberal
Judaism and Christianity is a way of having God without an afterlife, reincarnation is an
option for those who want an afterlife without God. The Newsweek Poll shows that 24 percent of Americans believe in reincarnation.").
40. Id. at 52-53.
[P]ublic-opinion polls show that most Americans not only believe in God but also
anticipate some kind of heaven. According to a recent NEWSWEEK Poll, 94 percent
of Americans believe that God exists and 77 percent believe in a heaven. Among
these believers, three out of four rate their chances of getting there good or excellent.
Id.; see also Showalter, supra note 38, at 116 ("For Christians, death is not seen as the
destruction or annihilation of the person. Although dissolution of the spirit-body bond that exists during our life on earth is painful, death, viewed as transformation of the person to a
new state of existence, is not.").
41. In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 75 (N.Y. 1981) (Jones, J., dissenting in part) ("The
courts can claim no particular competence to reach the difficult ultimate decision [on whether
medical treatment should be instituted or continued], depending as it necessarily must not
only on medical data, but on theological tenets and perceptions of human values which defy
classification and calibration.").
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beings can know how to weigh, even for themselves. The sense that
life has an inherent, unknowable value, often spoken of as the sanctity of life, 2 is also part of our sense that determining the scope of
the right to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment is uniquely difficult. The right to refuse medical treatment is sometimes conceived of
as an extension of the doctrine of informed consent.43 But there is
no such thing as informed consent because both the value of life and
the aftermath of death are unknowable."
3. Autonomy and the Incompetent Person
Discomfort with the right to refuse treatment is intensified because exercise of the right is often predicated on loss of autonomy. If
someone has lost competence without making a decision as to the
kind of medical treatment she would want if she became incompetent
or has never been competent to refuse medical treatment, the decision
cannot actually be made by the incompetent person. Difficulty arises
here because the necessity of making a decision outlasts, or exists
separately from, the decision-making ability of the person possessing
the right to decide."'
II. DISTINGUISHING

THE DECISION FROM THE RIGHT

When the capacity for autonomy on which liberty interests and
doctrines of consent are premised' has vanished, the decision re42. See, e.g., David A. Maraniss, John Paul's Farewell Mass Celebrates Life, WASH.
POST, Oct. 8, 1979, at Al (The Pope stated during Mass on the Mall in Washington D.C., "I
do not hesitate to proclaim before you and before the world ... that all human life-from
the moment of conception and through all subsequent stages-is sacred, because human life
is created in the image and likeness of God.").
43. See John N. Suhr, Jr., Note, Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health: A
Clear and Convincing Call for Comprehensive Legislation to Protect Incompetent Patients'

Rights, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 1477, 1479 n.5 (1991) ("The doctrine of informed consent is
designed to respect an individual's right of self-determination in medical treatment matters
and requires that physicians or other health care providers treat a patient only after having.
obtained the patient's consent.").
44. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 343 (1990)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[Niot much may be said with confidence about death unless it is
said from faith .... ").
45. See COORDINATING COUNCIL ON LIFE-SUSTAINING MEDICAL TREATMENT DECIsION
MAKING BY THE COURTS, GUIDELINES FOR STATE COURT DECISION MAKING IN LIFE-SUsTAINING MEDICAL TREATMENT CASES 74 (2d ed. 1993) ("[E]ven where no surrogate is recognized as having authority to make LSMT (life-sustaining medical treatment) decisions, some
LSMT decision has to be made, even if that decision is that the court has no authority but
to order the continuation of LSMT.").
46. See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 244 (1975) (stating that Fourteenth Amend-
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mains. Regardless of whether the incompetent person is capable of
exercising his or her right to refuse medical treatment, or whether the
person even retains that right in the face of his or her incompetence,47 the decision of whether to continue treatment remains to be

made. Non-action in this case is a decision. Where the required action
is decision-making, action and non-action both constitute actions,
because both are effectively decisions.
If a person is no longer sufficiently competent, her liberty interest is extinguished and the decision whether to refuse life-sustaining
medical treatment must be made either by someone who has a different legal right to make this decision or someone who has no legal
right to make the decision." If the state is deciding itself, it should
be extremely hesitant to terminate life-sustaining medical treatment."
To do so may deprive the incompetent person of her life interest."
To allow the state to discontinue treatment is to acknowledge the
state's authority to judge when a particular life is not worth continuing. Assessing the validity of a particular life is not the kind of decision we as a society generally want government to make." Only in
ment due process provides "not only a procedural guarantee against the deprivation of 'liberty,' but likewise protects substantive aspects of liberty against unconstitutional restrictions by
the State").
47. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 273 (citing In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229-33 (N.J.
1985) as "[r]easoning that the right of self-determination should not be lost merely because
an individual is unable to sense a violation of it").
48. See id. at 280 ("An incompetent person is not able to make an informed and voluntary choice to exercise a hypothetical right to refuse treatment or any other right. Such a
'right' must be exercised for her, if at all, by some sort of surrogate.").
49.
An erroneous decision not to terminate results in a maintenance of the status quo;
the possibility of subsequent developments such as advancements in medical science, the discovery of new evidence regarding the patient's intent, changes in the
law, or simply the unexpected death of the patient despite the administration of
life-sustaining treatment at least create the potential that a wrong decision will
eventually be corrected or its impact mitigated. An erroneous decision to withdraw
life-sustaining treatment, however, is not susceptible of correction.
Id. at 283; see also In re Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1233 ("When evidence of a person's wishes
or physical or mental condition is equivocal, it is best to err, if it all, in favor of preserving
life.").
50. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281 ("It cannot be disputed that the Due Process Clause
protects an interest in life as well as an interest in refusing life-sustaining medical treatment.").
The due process requirements established by Cruzan, where the state is exercising
control of an individual's liberty interest, may not be coextensive with the due process requirements implicated by state deprivation of a life interest. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 481 (1972) ("[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as
the particular situation demands.").
51. See, e.g., Callins v. Collins, 114 S. Ct. 1127, 1129 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,dissenting
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52
the absence of anyone truly intimate with the incompetent person
should the government be the decision-maker.5 3 Where no one is
intimately connected to the incompetent person and the choice is
therefore left to the government, given the possibility that the govern-

ment is wrong about death,' the decision must be life.
Im. DETERMINING INTERESTS

The authority to make a decision for someone else can no longer
be characterized as the exercise of a liberty interest. Liberty interests
are premised on traditional liberal notions of individual autonomy
which have at their heart the idea that each person has one's own
domain, guarded by rights which prevent interference from other
people or the state.5 A liberty interest is by definition an interest in
doing as one chooses rather than as someone else would choose.
Therefore it is not sensible to speak of a liberty interest as being
exercised where someone else is choosing in the rightholder's stead.
Substituted judgment is essentially substituted value. The judgment of someone who is sufficiently valuable in terms of autonomy is
substituted for that of a person who is not valuable in those terms.

from denial of certiorari).
[E]ven if we can feel confident that these [government] actors will fulfill their
roles to the best of their human ability, our collective conscience will remain uneasy. Twenty years have passed since this Court declared that the death penalty
must be imposed fairly, and with reasonable consistency, or not at all, see Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), and, despite the effort of the States and courts to
devise legal formulas and procedural rules to meet this daunting challenge, the
death penalty remains fraught with arbitrariness, discrimination, caprice, and mistake.
Id.
52. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 281 ("Not all incompetent patients will have loved ones available to serve as surrogate decisionmakers.").
53. See, e.g., Martha Minow, The Role of Families in Medical Decisions, 1991 UTAH L.
REv. I, 23 ("I think that families should be entrusted to make treatment decisions on behalf
of a comatose or incompetent relative absent a specific showing of their conflicting interests
because the alternative of a state decision-maker is not presumptively better.").
54. See, e.g., id. at 24 n.101 (describing experiences of Jackie Cole who recovered from
what had been classified as an irreversible coma); see also Tom Stacy, Death, Privacy, and
the Free Exercise of Religion, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 490, 497 n.23 (1992) (citing Jeremy
Brown, The Persistent Vegetative State: Time for Caution?, 66 POSTGRADUATE MED. J. 697
(1990)) ("suggesting that the rare reports of recovery from a persistent vegetative state undermine the conclusion that all patients in such a state have suffered brain damage permanently precluding consciousness").
55. See Note, Physician-Assisted Suicide and the Right to Die with Assistance, 105
HARV. L. REv. 2021, 2025 (1992).
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This equation treats those for whom the decision must be made as
possessions of the autonomous decision-maker. If someone is viewed
as lacking capacity to make a choice (read the "right" or rational

choice) about something that person putatively owns, the person who
is viewed as not being able to choose will not be allowed absolute
control-some sort of guardian or trustee will be appointed. Tangible

property owned by an incompetent person still belongs to him in
some sense' because he is still allowed to use it. In speaking of the
right to make a decision, use and possession are indistinguishable.
The ability to decide in this case is not merely the control of something but the thing itself.57 There are no other sticks in the bundle
where the "property" is the right to make a decision.
An individual's authority to exercise the right to refuse medical
treatment is dependent upon satisfying a competency standard. 8
Competency standards are adopted to identify those abilities considered indicative of ability to exercise a specific right. In the context of
the right to refuse medical treatment, the ability to base one's decision on factors that a reasonable person would consider in making
such a decision is generally not required. 9

56. See Linda S. Mullenix, Creative Manipulation of Federal Jurisdiction: Is There
Diversity After Death?, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 1011, 1014-15 n.13 (1985) (quoting McSparran
v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 870 (3d Cir. 1968)) ("[A] guardian of the person of a minor or
other incompetent has no interest in his ward's property and a guardian of his estate does
not take legal title to the property, which remains in the ward, but merely acts as its custodian or manager.").
57. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMmCAN CONSTrrtUTONAL LAw 936 n.11 (1978).
To be sure, Karen Quinlan [who had become completely incompetent] was not
'dead' in most of the increasingly multiple senses of that term, but the task of
giving content to the notion that she had rights, in the face of the recognition that
she could make no decisions about how to exercise any such rights, remains a
difficult one.
Id.
58. Paul S. Appelbaum & Thomas Grisso, Assessing Patients' Capacities to Consent to
Treatment, 319 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1635 (Dec. 22, 1988) ("Competent patients have the right
to decide whether to accept or reject proposed medical care. Patients thought to be incompetent are denied this right, and others make their decisions for them.").
59. See, e.g., Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978); State Dept. of
Human Serv. v. Northern, 563 S.W.2d 197, 210 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1978); see also Appelbaum
& Grisso, supra note 58, at 1636 (asserting that court holdings, "that as long as patients
understand and appreciate the relevant data, they have the right to reach decisions that outside observers consider irrational . . . . result[] from a failure to distinguish the outcome . . . from the process.").
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IV. DEFINING COMPETENCE
Capacity is the measure of societal authorization to act. If one

can direct oneself to accomplish a particular action within the
societally agreed-upon parameters for performance of that action,'
then capacity to perform that action has been established6 ' and is
rewarded with the right to act autonomously, without societal over-

sight.6' Those who perform that action in a non-societally-approved
way are considered to act irrationally and thus be incompetent. Such
people are no longer allowed to choose to effectively perform the

action."
A. The Legal Function of Capacity Determinations
Capacity or competency and the concomitant possession of the

right to act autonomously are societal conclusions premised on what
characteristics or patterns of behavior are considered prerequisites to
the exercise of a particular right.' Contracts may not be enforced

60. See THOMAS G. GUTHEIL & PAUL S. APPELBAUM, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAw 215 (1982) ("The Uniform Probate Code . . . defines incompetency as

follows: A mentally incompetent person is one who is so affected mentally as to be deprived
of sane and normal action, or who lacks sufficient capacity to understand in a reasonable
manner the nature and effect of the act he is performing.").
61.

See id. ("Specific competency is defined only in relation to a particular act: whether

one is competent to write a will, make a contract, testify in court, or stand trail for murder.").
62. Evaluating competence to contract entails an evaluation that resembles a determination of competency to refuse medical treatment. The evaluation in the case of competency
to contract requires weighing an individual right (that individuals should be able to contract
freely) against a burden imposed by society (that an individual should only be able to contract if she is aware that she is contracting and appreciates the consequences of doing so).
"The standard for determining competency to refuse medical treatment likewise requires a
balancing of individual autonomy rights and societal concerns." Benjamin Freedman, Competence, Marginal and Otherwise, 4 INT'L. J. L. & PSYCH. 53, 56-57 (1981).
63.
[Llet us face squarely the question of whether competency is an empirical or a
moral term. Does it describe a fact in the world, or how we evaluate that
fact? . . . Competence is not pure description . . . nor pure evaluation; but, per-

haps, an evaluation that stems from certain described facts coupled with a moral
theory that tells us what those facts mean, how we ought to respond to those
facts. A middle step between description and action is always needed, i.e., a moral
theory that interprets experience and guides action.
Id. at 55.
64. See Christopher T. Wonnell, The Contractual Disempowerment of Employees, 46

STAN. L. REv. 87, 88 (1993) ("In the Jim Crow South, blacks were often forbidden to enter
into contractual relationships allowed to whites. For many years, married women could not
enter into legally binding contracts. Notwithstanding the paternalistic justifications for these
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against minors because minors are perceived as lacking the capacity

to understand the ramifications of a contract.' That rationale has
societal consensus because it comports with our vision of what is re-

quired to make a contract enforceable" and our perceptions about
minors.67 In the past, married women were not allowed to act autonomously with regard to their property because maleness was considered a prerequisite for rationality, and rationality as a prerequisite for
the exercise of the right to alienate property or make contracts.' In

both cases understanding the consequences of entering into a contract
are important.69 This requirement is satisfied by constructive capaci-

ty. A showing of actual lack of understanding is generally not sufficient to invalidate a contract in the absence of a characteristic which
bars the possessor from making a binding contractual commitment as
a matter of law.7"

restrictions, modem observers recognize their tendency to disempower and economically weaken the targeted groups." (citations omitted)).
65. See Robert E. Richardson, Note, Children and the Recorded-Message Industry: The
Need for a New Doctrine, 72 VA. L. REV. 1325, 1332-33 (1986) ("Mhe so-called infancy
doctrine allows the minor to avoid or disaffirm contracts that later prove not to be in his
best interests, or that simply lose their appeal over time. The common law's view has traditionally been that children are naive and unsophisticated, especially in the marketplace." (citations omitted)).
66. See Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalistic Motives in Contract and Tort
Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD.
L. REV. 563, 645 (1982) ("The paternalist notion that contracts shouldn't be enforced if one
party lacks capacity is constitutive of the institution of freedom of contract.").
67. See, e.g., Daniel Goleman, Teen-Age Risk-Taking: Rise in Deaths Prompts New
Research Effort, N.Y. TMES, Nov. 24, 1987, at C1 ("From acrobatics on skateboards to sex
without contraceptives, teen-agers are notoriously reckless. Research suggests a combination of
hormonal factors, an inability to perceive risks accurately and the need to impress peers help
explain this. All of these influences seem to peak in the years between 10 and the mid20's.").
68. See Carl R. Grantham, Jr., Note, Why Does this River Flow? In re Cooper and the
Continued Prohibition of Contingency Fees in Divorce Actions, 65 N.C. L. REV. 1378, 1382
n.41 (1987).
The theory that married women lacked capacity to enter into contracts was derived
from feudal England. Upon a woman's marriage, her personal property and possessions came under the control of her husband. In exchange for his protection and
guardianship, she lost all capacity to enter into contracts unless she was contracting
as her husband's agent.
Id.
69. Alexander M. Meiklejohn, Contractual and Donative Capacity, 39 CASE W. RES. L.
Rav. 307, 308 (1988-89) ("[T]he capacity doctrine requires courts to identify the abilities that
are necessary for the exercise of contractual and donative choices.").
70. ARTHUR L. CoRwN, CoRErN ON CoNT.AcrS, § 104 at 153-54 (1 vol. ed. 1950).
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It is important to note that the legal background understanding
of competency is generally considered to comprise two elements.
The first is a bare knowledge of what you are doing: the fact that
you are making a contract; an example is the fact that you have

agreed to the doctor's removal of your appendix. The second element requires that you appreciate the conseqpences of the act, including its typical attendant pitfalls or dangers: the fact that, after

certain services have been provided, you will be legally required to
pay a certain sum; the fact that you will have a scar, etc.7 '

It is a fiction that knowledge and appreciation of consequences
are separate elements. Knowledge of an action incorporates apprecia-

tion of the qualities of that action, including consequences which flow
from that action. Equally, to appreciate the consequences of an action

one must understand or know what the action is. An action has little,
if any, meaning aside from the consequences of taking that action
since all characteristics of an action can be classified as consequences.
Therefore, the right to refuse medical treatment must be exercised
when the individual is still competent.'
B. The Complicated Role of Capacity Determinations in Cases
Involving the Right to Refuse Medical Treatment

Capacity to decide to exercise liberty based upon constitutional
rights is an integral part of possessing these rights. However, the right

to refuse life-sustaining medical treatment differs because it involves
competent people making a decision which may be premised on the

possibility that they will lose capacity.'

One of the central reasons

71. Freedman, supra note 62, at 56-57.
72. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990) ("The principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our previous decisions.") (citing Washington
v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990) (prisoner may not refuse administration of antipsychotic drugs); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494 (1980) (transferral of prisoner to mental
hospital); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979) (placement of children in psychiatric
hospital); Breithaupt v. Abrams, 352 U.S. 432, 439 (1957) (search and seizure); Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-30 (1905) (compulsory vaccination)).
73. See NULAND, supra note 29, at 151 (quoting Seneca).
I will not relinquish my old age if it leaves my better part intact. But if it begins
to shake my mind, if it destroys the faculties one by one, if it leaves me not life
but breath, I will depart from the putrid or tottering edifice. I will not escape by
death from disease so long as it may be healed and leaves my mind unimpaired.
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for seeking termination of life-sustaining treatment is that the person
who is receiving the treatment has permanently (short of a miracle)
lost the capacity to make decisions. It is often said that one "would

not want to live like that" with "that" meaning diminished from one's
former state in some significant way.' Diminished mental capability
is perceived as being more of a loss than diminished physical capability. Self-definition is more closely tied to mental capacity than to
physical capability. It is easier for us to imagine ourselves physically
disabled than mentally disabled." It seems somehow more alienating
and puts the person who has experienced the injury at a more profound distance from the rest of humanity than does a physical injury.
That separation from the whole is viewed as so tragic that the loss is
irreparable and the wish to die is considered reasonable.
A liberty interest which extends only to the competent raises

several problems. Such a conception makes, at least in relation to
liberty interests, competency the test of personhood.76 It is also not
clear what the measure of competency to decide to refuse medical
treatment should be. Reliance on capacity to make a "rational"'

Id.
74. See Yale Kamisar, Are Laws Against Assisted Suicide Unconstitutional?, 36 L.
QUADRANGLE NoTEs 29 (1993). Professor Kamisar notes that in the case of Nancy Cruzan,
"[n]o doubt many thought that she 'might as well be dead' or that she was 'better off dead'
but if her feeding tube had not been removed Nancy might well have been kept alive another 20 or 30 years." Id.at 34.
Professor Kamisar fears that a similar response may be common in regard to the dissimilar case of elderly people. "Ageism . . . may manifest itself in . . . the view that an
elderly person's desire to commit suicide is more rational than a younger patient's would be,
or, more generally, the attitude that the elder has every reason to be depressed or that 'if I
were in his place I would want to die too."' Id. at 35-36.
75. Norman L. Cantor, The Permanently Unconcious Patient, Non-Feeding and Euthanasia, 15 AM. J.L. & MED. 381, 414 (1989) ("The real reason why most people would prefer
death over permanent unconsciousness . . . is that an indefinite insensate limbo constitutes a
demeaning and degraded existence devoid of human dignity.").
76.
To be treated as a person, one must not only enjoy states of consciousness as well
as intentional states, but must also have the capacity to link together by memory
experiences which occur at different times . . . . Whether rationality or social
interactive capabilities are the controlling criteria to establish personhood remains
an open philosophical question.
George P. Smith 1n,All's Well that Ends Well: Toward a Policy of Assisted Rational Suicide
or Merely Enlightened Self-Determination?, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 275, 321 (1989).
77. See Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978) (noting that
expert testimony on which the trial court relied "indicates that . . . [there is no] incompetency in the legal sense, but rather that [the patient's] ability to make a rational choice (by
which [the doctor] means the medically rational choice) is impaired by . . . [the patient's]
consideration of irrational and emotional factors").
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choice creates the possibility that refusal of treatment itself will be
used as a basis for determinations of whether an individual has the
constitutionally required competence.78 One way of assessing competence is whether factors rationally related to the decision at hand
provide the bases of the decision. This raises the question of what
considerations are rational in deciding whether to refuse medical
treatment.79 The choice of standard is particularly likely to affect
meaningful possession of a right by someone who is in general marginally competent. Premising exercise of a right based upon notions
of respect for individualistic decision making on mandatory consideration of those factors most people would weigh is not necessarily
helpful or logically coherent where the basis for subjecting someone
to a competency test in the first place is that she is not like most
people.
"In general, to be considered competent an individual must be
able to comprehend the nature of the particular conduct in question
and to understand its quality and its consequences."' When considered in the context of a decision to refuse medical treatment, this
seemingly basic proposition raises several questions. What is the
nature of the decision to refuse medical treatment? Does it have a
general nature or is the nature dependent upon characteristics of the
particular treatment or on the severity or painfulness of the consequences? Is the nature of the decision different from its quality? Are
either the nature or the quality separable from the consequences?
V. THIRD PARTY EXERCISE OF THE RIGHTS OF INCOMPETENTS
Third parties have no right to exercise an incompetent
individual's liberty interest."' A family member is entitled only to a
78. See Kevin R. Wolff, Note, Determining Patient Competency in Treatment Refusal
Cases, 24 GA. L. REV. 733, 744 (1990) ("Clinicians have identified five traditional approaches to evaluating capacity in the informed consent context: (1) evidencing a choice; (2) reasonable outcome of choice; (3) rational reasons for choice; (4) ability to understand; and (5)
actual understanding." (citations omitted)). All but the first of these approaches invite the
evaluator to find incompetence based on the refusal of treatment. Cf. Lane, 376 N.E.2d at
1236 ("The law protects her right to make her own decision to accept or reject treatment,
whether that decision is wise or unwise[,]" and requires only that the patient, "understand
that . ..she is, in effect, choosing death over life.").
79. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229 (NJ. 1985) ("The question is not
what a reasonable or average person would have chosen to do under the circumstances but
what the particular patient would have done if able to choose for himself.").
80. Freedman, supra note 62, at 56 (quoting Loren H. Roth et al.,
Test of Competency
to Consent to Treatment, 134 AM. J.PsycH. 279 (1977)).
81. See Ira M. Ellman, Cruzan v. Harmon and the Dangerous Claim that Others Can
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rebuttable presumption that she is the preferred substitute decisionmaker, both where the incompetent person has always been incompetent and where there is no convincing evidence that a formerly

competent person exercised his right to accept or refuse life-sustaining
medical treatment. 2 It is not the disconnected state83 but the intimately-connected family which should make the choice.'
There are two ways to reach this result. One, implicit in the
decision of a number of courts, continues to focus on autonomy as
the important element and substitutes the will of some sufficiently
autonomous person or entity for the insufficient/inadequate/
unexercisable will of the incompetent person. Where the state allocates the power to make this decision on behalf of the incompetent
person to the family, the court is intimating that the incompetent
person belongs to the closest autonomous personY Alternately, the
court can focus on the need for disinterestedness and allocate the
incompetent's choice to a supposedly neutral party i.e., a guardian ad
litem. Neutrality may not be desirable or possible in assessing the
value or quality of someone else's life.' The value an individual
places on her life is inherently and ultimately personal.87 Many people whose lives seem enviable in every measurable aspect demonstrably do not place much value on continuing to live those lives. 8 Oth-

Exercise an IncapacitatedPatient's Right to Die, 29 Jupxd~iics J. 389, 393-94 (1989).
Since the autonomy principle is foundational to any constitutional claim that individuals may decide for themselves whether to accept or refuse life-sustaining treatment, the constitutional claim fails in [the case where a third party seeks to exercise the incompetent person's right]. The family's claim to decide cannot be
piggybacked on [the incompetent person's] autonomy.
Id.
82. See Browning v. Herbert, 568 So. 2d 4, 16 (Fla. 1990).
83. Cf Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 286 (1990) (indicating preference for disinterestedness of state over connectedness of family).
84. But see id at 286 ("Close family members may have a strong feeling-a feeling
not at all ignoble or unworthy, but not entirely disinterestedness, either-that they do not
wish to witness the continuation of the life of a loved one which they regard as hopeless,
meaningless, or even degrading.").
85. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 777 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting Charles Fried, Correspondence, 6 PHIL. &
PUB. AIF. 288-89 (1977)) ("Mhe concept of privacy embodies the 'moral fact that a person
belongs to himself and not others nor to society as a whole."').
86. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 327 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Is there any reason to suppose that a State is more likely to make the choice that the patient would have made than
someone who knew the patient intimately? To ask this question is to answer it.").
87. See id. at 281 ("The choice between life and death is a deeply personal decision of
obvious and overwhelming finality.").
88. See, e.g., Jason DeParle, A White House Death: Grief Wrapped in Confusion, N.Y.
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er lives seem pathetic or tragic from the outside but are clung to
nonetheless."
The other way of placing control with the families of incompe-

tent people, while properly valuing the incompetent people, is to
abandon the myopic vision of autonomy as the only valuable trait a
person can possess. This exaltation of autonomy has eroded the status
of families as units with their own dominion, and has limited recogni-

tion of the importance of each individual's status within the family
unit. An exclusive focus on individual autonomy obscures the reasonableness and fundamental rightness of having those people who love
an individual most, who are most closely connected to that individual,
decide for her when she cannot decide for herself.
A. Current Standards
Courts have primarily used either the "substituted-judgment" standard' ° or the "best-interests" standard" in assessing an incompetent
person's right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. The substituted-judgment standard directs the decision-maker to reach the same decision
that the incapacitated person would make if he or she could
choose.' Courts have applied the substituted-judgment standard in
two distinct ways. Under a subjective version courts narrow the inquiry to the incompetent person's intent." The easy case under this
standard is where the person made a living will or selected a health
TImEs. July 23, 1993, at A10 ("Why would a man [like Vincent Foster] who seemed to have
wealth, power and a happy family life kill himself as his career reached a storybook peak?");
Ira Robbins, Cobain Never Found Nirvana, NEWSDAY, Apr. 9, 1994, at 23 ("With everything
to live for, Kurt Cobain found only the nightmare. Misery made him famous, but fame could
not fix his life. Or save it."); see also THOMAS JEFFERSON, LEr=R TO JOHN ADAMs (1816)
("I enjoy good health: I am happy in what is around me, yet I assure you I am ripe for
leaving all this year, this day, this hour.").
89, See Lawrence Langer, Tainted Legacy: Remembering the Warsaw Ghetto, TiKKUN,
May 1993, at 37 (Langer quotes a diary kept in the Warsaw Ghetto during World War H in
which the author wrote upon his wife's seizure by Nazis, "eclipse of the sun, universal
blackness." Yet after a week had passed, added, "[i]f only I could die and be free of the
whole nightmare. But I am still tied to life and it is still difficult for me to take my own
life,").
90. See United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479 (4th Cir. 1987).
91. Ud.
92. See id.at 497 ("Courts employing substituted judgment have required that if a patient is medically incompetent, the decision-maker must attempt to determine what the patient
would have done if he were competent.").
93. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229 (NJ. 1985) ("The standard we are
enunciating is a subjective one, consistent with the notion that the right that we are seeking
to effectuate is a very personal right to control one's own life.").
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proxy while fully competent.94 Where the now-incompetent person
did not manifest any such express intent, the court considers all evidence of intent in light of its remoteness, consistency, thoughtfulness,
and specificity."
Ideally, the subjective substituted-judgment standard "maximizes
principles of self-determination and individuality" by directing decision-makers to concentrate on the values of the incompetent person
and disregard their own ideas of what is important. To ensure that the
decision-maker is actually focusing on the incompetent's values is difficult, and the less familiar the decision-maker is, or was, with the
incompetent person, the less likely it is that the decision-maker will
even be able to identify the values of the incompetent person. Courts
have held that the objective version of the substituted-judgment standard does not require express intent of an individual's treatment preference.' "Clear and convincing evidence of a person's intent can be
derived from the context of an individual's entire life. The person's
religious beliefs, philosophical views, life goals, and attitudes toward
death are appropriate factors to be considered."'
Under the best-interests standard the decision-maker uses "objective" criteria like pain, prognosis for recovery, and life expectancy to
assess whether "the burdens of a continued existence clearly outweigh
the benefits." Consideration of pain and prognosis are inherently
quality of life determinations. 9
B. Proposed Standardsfor Determining Competency and Allocating
Substitute Decision Making
An incompetent person's life interest is qualitatively different
from the state's interest in her life, since life interest is defined in the
Fourteenth Amendment as being held against the state.' A conflict

94. See id. (noting that "an intent not to have life-sustaining medical intervention . . .
might be embodied in a written document, or 'living will,' stating the person's desire not to
have certain types of life-sustaining medical treatment administered under certain circumstances.").
95. Ud
96. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 98 NJ. 321, 361-62 (NJ. 1985).
97. Christopher Supernor, Note, Ignoring an Incompetent Person's Constitutional Right
to Forgo Life-Sustaining Treatment, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 209, 224 (1991).
98. Some courts say that an accurate assessment of a person's best interests must include quality of life. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 689 (Ariz. 1981).
99. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1 ("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."); see also Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of
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arises when the state is characterized as the protector of the individual's rights by setting up a high evidentiary burden like a "clear and
convincing" standard." That burden falls on the individual, advancing the state's goal of preserving life by making it more difficult for
the individual to exercise her right.'"'
The decision to refuse medical treatment cannot itself be the
basis for a determination of incompetence to make a decision to
refuse treatment.0 2 "It hardly needs to be said that if a person can
be declared incompetent based on disagreement with a medical choice
he has made, the right to make personalized and individualized decisions concerning one's own body would become a nullity."'0 The
competency issue in United States v. Charters was whether a mentally ill prisoner had the right to refuse an antipsychotic drug. The
Fourth Circuit held that "to determine ... competence, the district
court should evaluate whether... [the individual] has followed a
rational process in deciding to refuse [medical treatment] and can give
rational reasons for the choice he has made. Latitude must be given
in defining a 'rational reason' supporting ... [the] decision."'0 4 The
scope of the Fourth Circuit's "latitude" may be gauged by the court's
recognition that

Health, 497 U.S. 261, 313 (1990) ("ITihe State as no legitimate general interest in someone's
life, completely abstracted from the interst of the person living that life, that could outweigh
the person's choice to avoid medical treatment.").
100.
[C]ourts have long erected clear and convincing evidence standards to place the
greater risk of erroneous decisions on those bringing disfavored claims ....

Mis-

souri has no such power to disfavor a choice by Nancy Cruzan to avoid medical
treatment, because Missouri has no legitimate interest in providing Nancy with
treatment until it is established that this represents her choice. Just as a State may
not override Nancy's choice directly, it may not do so indirectly through the imposition of a procedural rule.
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 316 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
101. Id.
Only [clear and compelling] evidence of specific statements of treatment choice
made by the patient when competent is admissible to support a finding that the
[now-incompetent] patient ...
would wish to avoid further medical treatment ....
No proof is required to support a finding that the incompetent person

would wish to continue treatment.
Id,
102. See, e.g.. Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E.2d 1232 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978); In re
Quackenbush, 383 A.2d 785 (N.J. 1978).
103. United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 479 (4th Cir. 1987).
104. Id. at 496.
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[t]he very foundation of the doctrine [of informed consent] is every
one's right to forego treatment or even cure if it entails what for
him are intolerable consequences or risks, however warped or perveted his sense of values may be in the eyes of the medical profession, or even of the community, so long as any distortion falls
short of what the law regards as incompetency." °
VI. EXERCISE OF AN AUTONOMY-BASED RIGHT IN THE ABSENCE OF
DECISION-MAKING CAPACITY

The autonomy notions which support the right of private choice
for competent patients are not effective in those cases where the
putative rightholder lacks the capacity to choose."° If the right is
the right to decide, then actual lack of decision-making capacity extinguishes the liberty interest. 7 The liberty interest can only be revitalized in such a case by transforming the value protected by the
liberty interest in a way which de-emphasizes decisional autonomy
and instead elevates respect for individuality.' 3 Valid personhood is
not dependent on decision-making capacity; there are other qualities
deserving of consideration and respect." 9 Predicating possession of

105. d
106. In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 72-73 (N.Y. 1981) ("John Storar was never competent
at any time in his life. He was always totally incapable of understanding or making a reasoned decision about medical treatment . . . Mentally John Storar was an infant and that is
the only realistic way to assess his rights in this litigation.").
107. See John Robertson, Cruzan: No Rights Violated, HAsTims CTR. REP., at 9 (Sept.Oct. 1990).
One could argue that an incompetent patient has a right to have a proxy decide
for the patient on the basis of her previous values. But that claim cannot be based
on the comatose patient's current interests (there are none) . . . . Surely there is
no consitutional right to be treated 'like one once was' now that one is so radically different.
Id
108. Cf Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 309 (1990)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988)) ("'The law
must often adjust the manner in which it affords rights to those whose status renders them
unable to exercise choice freely and rationally."').
109.
The meaning of respect for [Nancy Cruzan's] personhood, and for that of others
who are gravely ill and incapacitated, is, admittedly, not easily defined: Choices
about life and death are profound ones, not susceptible of resolution by recourse to
medical or legal rules. It may be that the best we can do is to ensure that these
choices are made by those who will care enough about the patient to investigate
his or her interests with particularity and caution.
Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 354 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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an autonomy interest on capacity may "negate[] the incompetent's
personality and violates his or her human dignity.' ' . The dilemma
caused by the desire not to degrade the incompetent person is that
those who value autonomy so highly are unsure of how to maintain

an individual's "human dignity" in a way other than the recognition
of that individual's right to act autonomously.' Because autonomy
values do not provide for meaningful evaluation of the rights of an
incompetent person, respect for individuality should replace decisionmaking autonomy as the value we seek to implement when consider-

ing who should be the incompetent person's decision-maker."' If
respect for individuality, even in the absence of decision-making
capacity, is incorporated into liberty interest analysis, decisions can be
left to the family of the incompetent person, who are presumptively
most likely to know what is of value to this particular incompetent
person, and therefore in a better position to make the determination.
The family of an incompetent person should not be empowered with
a governmentally granted "right" to decide for the incompetent person
because they are likely to have the best idea of what the incompetent
person would do if he were competent."' The general futility of determining what someone else would do' is compounded where the
incompetent person has never been competent." 5 The attempt in and

310. Phoebe A. Haddon, Baby Doe Cases: Compromise and Moral Dilemma, 34 EMORY
U. 545, 559 (1985).
111. Id. at 559 ("The question of withholding or withdrawing life sustaining treatment to
a seriously disabled incompetent thus draws into issue whether there is any meaningful way
of extending to an incompetent some protection respectful of his or her moral personality.").
112. Cf. NULAND, supra note 29, at 3 ("Every life is different from any that has gone
before it, and so is every death. The uniqueness of each of us extends even to the way we
die."). But cf. Robin West, Foreword: Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REV. 43,
100 (1990) ('The endless variability of subjective, individual life has its limit in natural
death. It is the antithesis of the experience of individuality, idiosyncracy, and peculiarity that
the liberal understands and celebrates as the essence that underlies individual existence.").
113. See In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 457 (NJ. 1987) (Handier, J., concurring) ("The
theory of substituted judgment is that if we know someone well enough-her ideals, values,
attitudes, philosophy of life-we can figure out how she would have reacted to a new situation.").
114. See Note, Burdens on the Free Exercise of Religion: A Subjective Alternative, 102
HARv. L. REv. 1258, 1271 n.79 (1989) (citing RICHARD J. BERNSTEI, BEYOND OBECTrVISM

AND RELATVISM 126-31 (1983)) ("Part of this difficulty is the inherent inability to know the
subjective. Courts never really have access to another's mind and must instead rely on fallible extrinsic evidence of subjective beliefs and feelings.").
115. See Cantor, supra note 75, at 422.
iTihe notions of indignity, degradation and humane medical handling are extremely
problematic in the context of the never-competent patient. We certainly cannot say
that the level of deterioration which would make continued medical intervention
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of itself is degrading because it treats the never-competent person as

a "normal" person" 6 by manipulating the realities of the situation in
order to make the decision be about autonomy instead of about the
incompetent person."'

The family of an incompetent person has a right in the moral
sense to decide about the incompetent person because they love the
incompetent person-they have cared for this person in every
sense."' Although the family may not make the choice that the in-

competent person would have made in some hypothetical universe
where the incompetency vanishes," 9 the decision has to be made
and the family are the people who are most likely to understand how
to value this person's life in the making of the decision."n Knowldegrading and inhumane for a previously competent patient would do the same for
a never-competent patient.
Id.
116. Cf. Catharine MacKinnon's analysis of standards based on gender difference and
those advocating gender-neutrality as inherently male-based.
Concealed is the substantive way in which man has become the measure of all
things. Under the sameness standard, women are measured according to our correspondence with man, our equality judged by our proximity to his measure. Under
the difference standard, we are measured according to our lack of correspondence
with him, our womanhood judged by our distance from his measure. Gender neutrality is thus simply the male standard, and the special protection rule is simply
the female standard, but do not be deceived: masculinity or maleness, is the referent for both.
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Difference and Dominance, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 32, 34
(1987).
117. If mental composition is the essence of who someone is, the always-incompetent
person is himself as much as someone with a more standard mental composition. See
Kamisar, supra note 74, at 33 ("How can self-determination have any limits? Why are not a
person's desires or motives, whatever they be, sufficient?") (quoting CALIAHAN, supra note
37).
118.
[The incompetent person's] mother over his lifetime had come to know and sense
his wants and needs and was acutely sensitive to his best interests; . . . she had
provided more love, personal care, and affection for [him] than any other person
or institution, and was closer to feeling what [he] was feeling than anyone
else; . . .his best interests were of crucial importance to her ....
In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64, 78-79 (N.Y. 1981) (Jones, J.,dissenting in part).
119. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 286 (1990)
("[Tihere is no automatic assurance that the view of close family members will necessarily be
the same as the patient's would have been had she been confronted with the prospects of her
situation while competent."); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d at 72 ("lit is unrealistic to attempt to
determine whether [an always-incompetent person] would want to continue potentially life
prolonging treatment if he were competent.").
120. See NoRMAN L. CANTOR, LEGAL FRONTImS OF DEATH AND DYING 105 (1987)
(recognizing that "the surrounding loved ones . . . possess[] maximum knowledge of the
moribund patient's preferences, tastes, hopes, and aspirations, and presumptively possess[] an
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edge of the person entitles the family to decide because they are best
equipped to make a decision which treats the person with meaningful

dignity. The consensus is that the incompetent are entitled to be treated with dignity'

although there is little sense of how to do so. Lo-

cating decision-making authority in the state disregards individuality.

22

Allowing family members to decide, based upon the fiction of

substituted judgment treats the incompetent person's liberty interest,
and consequently the person herself, as belonging to autonomous

family members.'
In order to treat the incompetent person with dignity, the authority to make decisions should be given those who are most likely to

understand how to value this individual person."

The very concept

of treating people with dignity involves treating each individual as

valuable."

Since the way in which individuals are of value is their

abiding concern for the patient's welfare").
121.
It does not advance the interest of the State or the ward to treat the ward as a
person of lesser status or dignity than others. To protect the incompetent person
within its power, the State must recognize the dignity and worth of such a person
and afford to that person the same panoply of rights and choices it recognizes in
competent persons.
Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 435 (Mass. 1977).
122.
Rights language . . . can only express the human ideal of fraternity as mutual respect for rights, and it can only defend the claim to be treated with dignity in
terms of our common identity as rights-bearing creatures . . . The administrative
good conscience of our time seems to consist in respecting individuals' rights
while demeaning them as persons.
MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE NEEDS OF STRANGERS 13 (1985).
123.
In an admirable effort to affirm individual autonomy and to authorize individuals
to protect their humanity from the cruelty of fate, the majority have overlooked the
limits of our power to accomplish such goals . . . . [ITt would be an error of
great magnitude to conflate a substituted judgment with an actual judgment. Such a
mistake is a far greater blow against individual autonomy than it might as first
seem. It is paternalism masquerading as the mere ratification of autonomous choice.
Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 643 (Mass. 1986) (Lynch, J.,
dissenting in part).
124. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 325 (1990)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Steven A. Newman, Treatment Refuisals for the Critically
and Terminally Ill: Proposed Rules for the Family, the Physician, and the State, 3 N.Y.L.S.
HUM. RTs. ANN. 35, 46 (1985)) ("'Family members have a unique knowledge of the patient
which is vital to any decision on his or her behalf."')
125, Cf Hannah, supra note 34, at 460.
As Mark Twain wrote: "The dignity of death-the only earthly dignity that is not
artificial-the only safe one . . . . Death--the only immortal who treats us all
alike, whose pity and whose peace and whose refuge are for all-the soiled and
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capability of autonomous decision making,'" treating them with dignity (i.e., respecting them as individuals) usually depends on allowing
them to make choices. Where that measure of dignity is not available,

the emphasis on autonomy must be abandoned in favor of a way of
treating people as individuals which recognizes their connectedness to
others as itself a source of dignity because it is a source of being
known.'2 7
VII.

CONCLUSION

Families are the potential decision-makers most likely to base
medical treatment decisions on the individual identity of the incompe-

tent person'

and least likely to measure a life (always a subjective

endeavor) in objective terms. In those situations where the family is
demonstrably unlikely to know this incompetent person and thus not
know how to value him or her, someone else close to the incompetent person should be able to petition the court to be recognized as
the proper decision-maker regarding medical treatment.'2 9 Only if
there is no potential decision-maker with sufficiently intimate knowledge of the incompetent person should the state assume the decisionmaking role, which is then limited to maintaining medical treatment.

the pure-the rich and the poor-the loved and the unloved."
Id.
126. See CANTOR, supra note 120 ("[Hluman dignity in the context of death and dying
is coning to mean . . .respect for the human prerogative to exercise self-determination.").
127. See, e.g., Barbara Moretti, Note, Outing: Justifiable or Unwarranted Invasion of
Privacy? The Private Facts Tort as a Remedy for Disclosure of Sexual Orientation, 11
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 857, 869 n.55 (1993) (describing the right to privacy as "the
right to define one's circle of intimacy--to choose who shall see beneath the quotidian
mask").
128. See Bender, supra note 35, at 537-38 ("Caring for dying people requires careful
attention to their particularized needs. The caregivers must discover what those needs are by
listening to the patient; conversing with her and with those who know her best and are responsible for her care .... .
129.
[We prohibit family members from mercifully ending the suffering of loved ones
or create high legal barriers to families making termination of life-support decisions
for incompetent loved ones based on our fear of bad families. The social and
ethical price of designing our laws and rules for the bad actors is significant suffering and indignity to innocent, humane people because of unnecessary restraints
on their freedom to act out of care in a manner responsive to particularized circumstances of need.
Id. at 532.
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Status as a member of family is more informative of essential identity
than status as a citizen.' Therefore, a family decision-maker should
be accorded greater discretion than is permitted the state.
Jean Kephart Cipriani"

130. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 327-28 (1990)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
Family members are best qualified to make substituted judgments for incompetent
patients not only because of their peculiar grasp of the patient's approach to life,
but also because of their special bonds with him or her .

.

. It is

. .

. they who

treat the patient as a person, rather than a symbol of a cause. [citation omitted]
The State, in contrast, is a stranger to the patient.
Id. (quoting In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 445 (NJ. 1987)).
* The author thanks Professor Janet Dolgin, D. Peter DeSimone and Steven R. Barnett
for their encouragement, assistance and trust.
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